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Abstract 
This paper offers preliminary reflections on the direction and impact of the emerging ‘ethical 
minerals’ agenda, focusing specifically on the case of sub-Saharan Africa.  Over the past two 
decades, the mining industry in this region has experienced profound change, reshaped by 
large injections of foreign investment.  During this period, host governments have redrafted 
fiscal policies in an attempt to attract multinational mining and exploration companies.  These 
moves, however, have stifled the regularization of artisanal and small-scale mine operators, 
hundreds of thousands of whom have struggled to secure their own permits due to a lack of 
available land, the exorbitant costs of legalizing their activities, and excessively-bureaucratic 
registration processes.  Ethical mineral schemes and standards, which seek to connect 
producers to consumers, have been championed as potential mechanisms for alleviating the 
hardships of these operators.  But further analysis reveals that there is considerable 
discrepancy between the implied and at times, stated, aims and impacts of the interventions 
being piloted/implemented in the region on the one hand, and what is actually happening in 
practice on the other hand.  The analysis serves as a stark reminder that the ethical mineral 
schemes and standards being piloted/implemented are not development interventions, as is 
often believed.   
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Introduction 
This paper reflects critically on the direction and impact of the ‘ethical minerals’ 
agenda, focusing specifically on the case of sub-Saharan Africa.  Over the past two decades, 
the region’s mining sector has undergone profound transformation, reshaped by large 
injections of foreign investment.  During this period, host governments have redrafted fiscal 
policies with the aim of ‘growing’ their large-scale mineral exploration and mining 
economies.  The rapid expansion of activity that has followed, however, has often stifled 
efforts to formalize and support artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) – the low-tech 
labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing undertaken mostly by local people.   
Although long neglected in development circles, ASM’s economic importance can no 
longer be disputed.  In sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to providing jobs to millions of 
otherwise-unemployed people, and tens of millions more in the downstream industries it 
spawns (Table 1), the sector’s activities account for a sizable proportion of the region’s 
mineral output, including gold, diamonds and coloured gemstone production, and in many 
countries, have inseparable links with subsistence agriculture.  Those who engage in ASM in 
sub-Saharan Africa, however, mostly do so informally, without a license and generally, under 
suboptimal working conditions (Hilson, 2016).  Aspiring licensees have struggled to secure 
permits due to a lack of available land, significant quantities of which have been demarcated 
to, and are now controlled by, foreign large-scale mineral exploration and mining companies; 
the exorbitant costs of registration, brought about by host governments which have failed to 
take stock of the circumstances facing the individuals in question, in particular the limited 
financial means at their disposal; and excessively-bureaucratic registration, a direct result of 
formalization processes not being sufficiently decentralized in practice (ILO, 1999; Hentschel 
et al., 2002; Hilson and Potter, 2005; Banchirigah, 2006; van Bockstael, 2014).  The 
experiences, working conditions and struggles of these miners are well-documented in the 
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literature (Fisher, 2007; Tschakert and Singha, 2007; Hilson and Potter, 2005).  Discouraged 
and marginalized, most have elected to lead an informal sector existence. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Without an accurate picture of these dynamics, policymakers and donors have, not 
surprisingly, struggled to formalize and support small-scale miners across sub-Saharan 
Africa.  More creative, dynamic solutions are desperately needed if the region’s artisanal and 
small-scale mine operators who now find themselves entrenched – and occasionally, trapped 
– in the informal economy are to escape its clutches.  Ethical mineral schemes and standards, 
the vast majority of which, according to their designers (mostly NGOs and industry bodies), 
seek to connect these miners to the manufacturing and retail ‘space’ and in the process, 
develop supply chains in which commodities can be traced to their origin, could assist 
immeasurably on this front.  The schemes piloted/implemented in sub-Saharan Africa are 
mostly packaged as ‘pro-poor’ interventions capable of empowering these individuals and 
lifting them out of poverty.  Designers’ skilful use of development jargon and imagery which 
hint that marginalized operators are, indeed, the focus of these schemes, has provided a 
much-needed source of inspiration at a time when informal ASM activity is expanding 
unabated across the region.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  the	  policy	  and	  development	  agenda	  for	  ASM	  is	  focused	  on	  formalization	  –	  bringing	  
activities	  into	  the	  legal	  domain,	  where	  they	  are	  treated	  as	  any	  other	  small	  business.	  	  Experts	  have	  openly	  
debated	  whether	  formalization	  is	  the	  ‘silver	  bullet’,	  capable	  of	  resolving	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  ASM.	  	  
This	  includes	  the	  reviewer	  of	  this	  paper,	  who	  stated	  ‘The	  assumption	  which	  is	  implicit	  in	  this	  paragraph	  is	  that	  
formalisation	  is	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  in	  the	  sector.	  This	  assumption	  is	  not	  valid	  -­‐	  the	  legal/formal	  status	  
of	  an	  activity	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  negotiations	  will	  be	  somehow	  more	  just	  or	  favourable	  to	  marginalised	  actors	  
–	  what	  has	  been	  happening	  in	  the	  LSM	  sector	  for	  decades	  is	  testimony	  to	  that’.	  	  What	  the	  reviewer	  and	  
countless	  others	  seem	  to	  overlook,	  however,	  are	  the	  many	  changes	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  made	  in	  order	  for	  
governments	  to	  be	  in	  a	  realistic	  position	  to	  formalize:	  freeing	  up	  land,	  prospecting	  and	  identifying	  viable	  areas	  
for	  people	  to	  work,	  simplifying	  licensing	  schemes,	  and	  encouraging	  support	  services	  for	  activities.	  	  
Formalization	  would	  also	  put	  regulators	  in	  an	  improved	  position	  to	  address	  more	  comprehensively	  the	  
environmental,	  health	  and	  safety	  and	  social	  concerns	  which	  have	  long	  plagued	  the	  sector	  and	  have	  intensified	  
due	  to	  its	  widespread	  illegality.	  	  In	  short,	  whilst	  formalization	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  ‘cure	  all’	  for	  all	  of	  the	  
sector’s	  problems,	  it	  would	  certainly	  put	  policymakers	  in	  an	  improved	  position	  address	  a	  number	  of	  pressing	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Further analysis, however, reveals a very different story: that most such interventions 
are not targeting the poor and needy at all but rather established small-scale miners.  There is 
little disputing that the programs being launched in sub-Saharan Africa could help to 
empower marginalized artisanal miners.  But few appear to have been conceived for this 
purpose, despite claims which may suggest otherwise.  Most were rather launched to 
facilitate the supply of minerals capable of being tracked from the sites where well-
networked miners are working, through to manufacturers and retailers, essentially via the 
most navigable routes possible. The result, in most cases, has simply been a retracing and 
fortification of the supply chains these operators are a part of.  
The paper begins by examining more closely the changes that have occurred in 
mineral-rich sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades.  Emphasis is placed on explaining how 
the region’s informal ASM economy was ‘created’, and ultimately, highlighting the areas 
which ethical mineral schemes and standards should be targeting and the challenges with 
doing so.   Section 3 of the paper examines more closely which groups the schemes and allied 
interventions launched in the region to date are actually targeting and empowering, and 
surveys their impact at the local level.  As will be shown, there is considerable discrepancy 
between the suggested aims and impacts of the ethical mineral schemes and standards being 
piloted/implemented in sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand, and what is actually happening 
in practice on the other hand.  The paper concludes by reflecting critically on the direction the 
ethical minerals agenda is taking in sub-Saharan Africa, and offers recommendations on how 
to recalibrate efforts to ensure that they better serve the needs of the region’s poorest mine 
operators.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concerns.	  	  But	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  making	  all	  of	  the	  above	  changes	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  sector	  is	  on	  
governments’	  radar.	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Manoeuvring in the Reformed Mining Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa 
It is instructive to first provide some level of detail on the locations in sub-Saharan 
Africa where ethical mineral schemes and standards are being piloted and implemented.  As 
indicated, the countries where this work is being undertaken have endured profound 
economic transformation in recent decades.  Who are the poor miners in the region in need of 
assistance and who should be the focus of ethical mineral schemes and standards?  This 
section of the paper identifies these miners, and the circumstances that have contributed to 
their marginalization. 
 
Circumnavigating Mineralized Landscapes 
In addition to sweeping changes made under structural adjustment, most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have, in recent years, implemented major mining sector reforms 
(Campbell, 2012) aimed specifically at revitalizing defunct mineral exploration facilities and 
underperforming extraction projects (Otto et al., 2006).  The World Bank has catalyzed this, 
providing counsel and lending to host governments: it contributed, during the period 1988-
2012 alone, approximately US$1.4 billion to support mining sector reform.2  Through a series 
of technical support loans which have emphasized the overhauling of laws, fiscal regimes and 
regulatory institutions, the Bank, alongside other donors, has changed the investment climate 
for mining in sub-Saharan Africa.  By 1995, 35 of the region’s countries had revised their 
mining codes (Campbell, 2010), many of which have since been further amended (Table 2), 
for the sole purpose of luring foreign investment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  ‘Mining:	  Sector	  Results	  Profile’,	  www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/14/mining-­‐results-­‐profile	  (Accessed	  
11	  July	  2014.	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There have certainly been considerable macroeconomic gains from mining sector 
reform observable across sub-Saharan Africa.  By ushering in new policies and legislation, 
host governments have established more appealing economic climates; this has stimulated 
rapid investment in mineral exploration and extraction.  World Bank officials regularly draw 
attention to these ‘achievements’, singling out the experiences of a small group of countries, 
in particular Tanzania and Ghana.  In the former, the Mining Sector Technical Assistance 
Project, 1994¸ is often credited with stimulating marked increases in gold production. By 
2004, annual gold production was 1.4 million oz, and there were six large-scale mines in 
production/development alongside 3000 prospecting licenses: private investment in the 
sector, during the period 2001-2008 alone, was reportedly US$250 million annually 
(McMahon, 2010).  In Ghana, gold mine production increased 700 percent, on the back of 
US$4 billion in investment, during the period 1983-1998 (Aryee, 2001).  This was facilitated 
by a lowering of corporate income tax to 35 percent in 1994, the removal of import duties on 
mine-relevant commodities, and a reduction in the minimum royalty rate to 3 percent of 
profits (Campbell, 2010).  Africa, long a neglected space on the mining ‘map’, was re-
emerging as a major player: by the late 1990s, it was attracting 28 percent of global 
investment in mining, more than double the amount a decade earlier (Bridge, 2004).      
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The recent resurgence of industrial-scale mining interests in sub-Saharan Africa, 
however, presents two major challenges to organizations committed to empowering 
disadvantaged groups through ethical mineral schemes and standards.  The first is a territorial 
concern.  The Bank’s landmark report, A Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), 
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provided the initial blueprint for mining sector reform in the region, drawing on the 
experiences of its ‘first generation’ of reformers, namely Ghana, as well as those of other 
developing countries, such as Chile.  The document argues that ‘Modern mining codes 
intended to provide a framework for large-scale private investment rest on two guiding 
principles: the investor has the right to explore for and mine minerals in return for specific 
commitments which can be assessed and monitored; and the investor should have secure and 
long-term title to mining rights’ (p. 21).  It first called on host countries to formulate 
favourable ‘tax packages’ for large-scale miners.         
What seems to be overlooked repeatedly in discussions about ethical minerals and 
standards, at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, is the availability of land – specifically, 
how the overhaul of mine investment policies, despite triggering the aforementioned 
explosion in production and exploration, has also led to sizable sections of the region coming 
under the control of foreign multinationals.  For example, in Uganda, in the mid-2000s, there 
were 221 outstanding exploration licenses (136 Exclusive Prospecting Licenses, 95 Location 
Licenses, and 15 Mining Leases) in the country, more than four times the number of licenses 
in 1990 (Government of Uganda, 2005). In Ghana, as much as 40 percent of gold-mineralized 
land could be in the hands of close to 400 foreign mining and mineral exploration companies 
(Hilson, 2011b), and in Tanzania, by the mid-2000s, the situation had become equally serious 
because companies were being granted areas as large as 150 km2 for reconnaissance and 
prospecting (Lange, 2006).  A quick glance at the concession maps available on Flexcadastre 
(http://www.spatialdimension.com/Map-Portals), including those of Tanzania, the DR Congo, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Uganda, illustrate, clearly, the extent of the problem. 
Ferguson (2005, 2006) and others (e.g. Ackah-Baidoo, 2012) fittingly refer to these 
enormous spaces as ‘resource enclaves’, arguing how, despite being pockets of ‘booming’ 
extractive industry activity, they are largely mirages: that attractive investment climates – in 
9	  
	  
this case, for large industrial-scale mining – have facilitated capital ‘hopping’ into, as 
opposed to ‘flowing’ through and catalyzing development in, these settings.  Whilst this 
argument has buoyed debates on the resource curse, a discussion beyond the scope of the 
present paper, recognizing the ownership and power dynamics of resource enclaves is 
nevertheless important as it helps to underscore the challenge with launching ethical mineral 
schemes and standards aimed at empowering marginalized operators.   
The reform-induced mining renaissance which swept across sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1990s and early-2000s ushered in a number of ‘new faces’ to the region, a long list of 
multinationals headed by Barrick Gold and Newmont Gold Mining, as well as countless 
Canadian, American and Australian-headquartered exploration companies.  The ‘resource 
enclaves’ awarded to these companies are not only sizable, as indicated, but are also 
autonomous: territories that have come under the exclusive control of, and policed by, the 
corporations they were demarcated to.  The organizations looking to design and implement 
ethical mineral schemes and standards, therefore, face the onerous task of circumnavigating 
this vast territory and potentially wrestling demarcated space away from these multinationals.  
This leads to the second concern, which is the ability of an individual to exercise 
agency, particularly when it comes to brokering financial transactions.  Though at times 
seemingly idealistic and rather simplistic in their explanation, in the field of international 
development, some of the more widely cited works are those of Amartya Sen, who equates 
agency and empowerment with individual freedoms.  Drawing heavily on the experiences of 
disempowered groups in India, the author initially argued ‘Agency freedom is freedom to 
achieve whatever the person, as a responsible agent, decides he or she should achieve’ (Sen, 
1985, p. 169), and later reasoned that ‘Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help 
themselves, and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of 
development’ (Sen, 1999, p. 18-19).  Despite having his share of detractors, Sen must be 
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credited with helping to galvanize thinking about empowerment of the disadvantaged by 
drawing attention to the importance of ‘freedom and capability in a sense in which it entails 
decisive preference, not necessarily decisive choice’ (Pettit, 2001, p. 15).  It is not the 
intention here to champion or to build on Sen’s work but rather to underscore how it has 
reduced ‘The transformative project of development…to that of enlarging individual agency 
understood as choice-making capacity’ (Chandler, 2013, p. 15).  His work has spawned 
landmark texts (e.g. Narayan 2002; Alsop et al. 2006) which capture the essence of the 
struggles endured by marginalized groups, and the challenge of restoring their agency to a 
point where they can renegotiate their situations. 
For the ethical mineral schemes and standards being implemented in sub-Saharan 
Africa to have any chance of restoring agency to disempowered mine operators, designers 
will need to conceptualize, more dynamically, the Global Production Network (GPN), a 
metaphor commonly used in geographical scholarship ‘to capture the multi-stranded 
connections between producers, traders, retailers and consumers’ (Hughes et al., 2008, p. 4).  
Calls made by Carswell and De Neve (2013) for a more ‘horizontal’ approach of GPNs, 
specifically how, in addition to ‘vertically linked production networks’, labour agency is also 
fashioned ‘as much by social relations and livelihood strategies that are themselves embedded 
in a wider regional economy and cultural environment’, have particular resonance here.  A 
‘horizontal analysis’, explain Neilson and Pritchard (2010), ‘understands fair and ethical 
trade as a set of introduced discourse and practices within producer communities that are 
already institutionally embedded within particular sociospatial environments’, and which ‘can 
bring into focus partialities, contradictions, and challenges that may accompany the incursion 
of these agendas within regional production systems’ (p. 1834).  Undertaking such an 
analysis of mining in sub-Saharan Africa would no doubt yield fresh insight into the lives of 
marginalized operators.  
11	  
	  
Connecting with the Marginalized Mine Operator 
Who, exactly, are the miner equivalents of the farmers being targeted by ethical and 
Fair Trade certification bodies in underdeveloped sections of the globe such as sub-Saharan 
Africa?  As has been reported by several researchers in recent years (e.g. Hilson and Pardie, 
2006; Jønsson and Fold, 2009), the region’s most marginalized miners operate on a small and 
artisanal scale, and, as noted at the outset of this discussion, tend to be confined to the 
informal economy. Their lack of security of tenure typically leads to interactions with a host 
of unsavoury individuals at the local level who are looking to extract payments: chiefs, 
various middlemen, landowners and government officials.  In recent years, ‘horizontal 
analysis’ of selected ASM communities in the likes of Ghana and Tanzania (Fisher, 2007; 
Hilson, 2010) has revealed how complex the organizational structures can be at the local 
level; cast light on the number of actors engaged in activities both directly and indirectly, and 
the composition of labour hierarchies; and captured how challenging the removal of 
exploitative characters from the system can be.   
The dynamics that have surfaced, however, are largely a result of operators being 
confined to informal ‘spaces’, which has prevented them from accessing credit, finance and 
training.  Failure to do so, in turn, exposes unlicensed miners to the many nuances of the 
informal economy, where, out of desperation, they are often forced to partner with local 
actors, forging deals which are not on their own terms.  Drawing on the works of Narayan 
(2002), Alsop et al. (2006) and others, Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) argue that the solution to 
empowering such marginalized groups is: 1) agency-related, specifically – and reinforcing 
points raised earlier – enhancing ‘their [marginalized peoples’] ability to act on behalf of 
what you value and have reason to value’; and 2) emphasizing change to the institutional 
environment so that individuals can ‘exert agency fruitfully’ (p. 383).   
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In the case of ASM, it is largely the latter which has magnified the former.  The key 
challenge, institutionally, is coping with the large-scale mining ‘bias’ that has produced 
countless foreign-controlled extractive enclaves across sub-Saharan Africa, often at the 
expense of ASM’s growth and development.  Whilst the rhetoric may suggest that a number 
of donors, NGO groups and host governments now recognize this, the policy and institutional 
machinery in place for mining was, quite problematically, designed with this bias in mind.  It 
was, again, A Strategy for African Mining which helped to lay the initial groundwork, calling 
on host governments to treat large-scale and small-scale mining equally – that ‘A state 
mining enterprise should compete on the same terms as a privately-owned company, foreign 
on the same terms as national, large companies under the same broad rules as small ones’ – in 
policy, despite being two very different activities (World Bank, 1992, p. 22). 
The Bank’s position on ASM seemed little different to the views circulating in donor, 
policymaking and academic circles at the time: namely, that the sector was populated solely 
by enterprising businessmen looking to ‘get rich quick’, and that reformed regulatory 
frameworks implemented for operators should be designed with this in mind.  Shaped heavily 
by this perception, the institutional and policy structures that have emerged in sub-Saharan 
Africa for ASM over the past three decades have, not surprisingly, proved both ineffective 
and inappropriate.  As indicated, prospective small-scale permit holders have struggled to 
secure a license, which has given rise to the countless informalized mining ‘spaces’ found 
across the region today.  Over the past decade, these ‘spaces’ have proliferated, as wider 
economic changes in the region, ushered in by structural adjustment, have pushed hundreds 
of thousands of African families to the edge.  Many have had no choice but to turn to ASM 
out of desperation for additional income (Barry, 1996; ILO, 1999; Hentschel et al., 2002).           
 But whilst the need to connect with and empower those confined to informal ASM 
‘spaces’ in sub-Saharan has never been more pressing, doing so in a coordinated fashion 
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requires understanding why these dynamics have emerged altogether.  The first reason why is 
the pedestrian pace at which ASM has been legalized and formalized under reform.  The 
main purpose of mining sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa, and a message preached 
throughout A Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), is to transform the sector into 
a vibrant export-led industry which, World Bank officials and other proponents claim, could 
generate the revenue so desperately coveted by host governments.  As explained, the 
blueprint being promoted calls for a major overhaul of taxation policies to encourage foreign 
investment in mineral exploration and mining.   
This could explain why, at least in the case of the region’s initial wave of reformers, 
ASM was not prioritized from the beginning.  If the aim was to avoid creating ‘differential 
access to mineral rights’, as prescribed by A Strategy for African Mining, then ASM, with its 
mostly local inputs and low investment, could never be relied upon to generate export-led 
growth.  Host governments, therefore, would not have felt compelled to address ASM 
concerns immediately.  Such was the case in Ghana, for example, where the sector was not 
fully legalized until a full three years after the passing of the Minerals and Mining Law, a 
landmark piece of legislation designed specifically to facilitate foreign investment in large-
scale gold mining and exploration (Aryee et al., 2003; Hilson and Potter, 2005).  Tanzania, 
which ushered in reform with the passing of its 1998 Mining Act, only began seriously 
attending to the needs of ASM following implementation of its newest piece of mining 
legislation, the 2010 Mining Act.  As Jønsson and Fold (2014) explain, it properly 
decentralized licensing procedures for operators and abolished the Primary Prospecting 
Licensing (PPL), which, under the pre-existing Mining Act, was a stepping stone to a Primary 
Mining License (PML), Tanzania’s equivalent of a small-scale mining permit.  The ASM 
sector, despite its low levels of mechanization, minimal capital investment and poverty-
driven nature, was being viewed and handled identically to large-scale mining: as an industry 
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with complex, drawn-out ‘stages’ such as prospecting and exploration, and therefore 
requiring different licenses for each.  By the time governments began to recognize the 
inappropriateness of this approach, however, large-scale enclaves were already firmly in 
place. 
The second reason concerns the permitting systems installed for ASM in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Few, if any, seem to equip eligible permit holders with the requisite agency to 
negotiate the excising of plots of their choice and on their own terms.  In fact, and as 
underscored in the landmark report, Social and Labour Issues in Small-Scale Mining (ILO, 
1999), the permitting systems and procedures installed have done precisely the opposite: 
ASM, it correctly points out, ‘is bedevilled with too many regulations that are mostly 
designed to constrain it’ (np).  Ironically, in their attempts to not ‘create differential access to 
mineral rights’, host African governments have made it difficult, if not impossible, for small-
scale miners to secure the requisite permits.  In Ghana, it has been a case of licensing fees 
being exorbitant – registration and associated fees amounting to tens thousands of US dollars 
– and there being lengthy delays on decisions on applications (Hilson et al., 2014).  The same 
appears to be happening in Tanzania:   
…the 2010 Mining Act (as did the 1998 Mining Act) dictates ‘first come, first served’ 
procedures regarding license acquisition. However, although gold discoveries are often 
made by artisanal miners or local people, the restricted capacity of mining authorities to 
disseminate legislative information on how to acquire licenses to artisanal miners in a 
timely manner favours large-scale and junior mining companies as well as well-
connected, typically urban-based, speculators. These have in-depth knowledge of the 
legislation and secure licenses in mineral-rich areas before the vast majority of artisanal 
miners know of the opportunity…When gold was discovered in Londoni, a foreign 
junior company was interested in securing a Prospecting Licence (PL) to the area. As a 
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consequence, artisanal miners’ initial PML applications were rejected. The ones who 
had already put up pegs for their requested claims subsequently lobbied to get the area 
designated for artisanal mining. [Jønsson and Fold, 2014, p. 118-119] 
There have been reports of the same taking place in other countries in the region, notably 
Zimbabwe and Zambia.3   
The rhetoric towards ASM has certainly changed in donor circles over the past 
decade, largely in response to mounting evidence that the sector is markedly distinctive from 
large-scale mining and therefore warrants its own ‘space’ in policy.  But in the case of sub-
Saharan Africa where, during this time, in response to deteriorating economic conditions and 
mounting poverty, ASM has become a vital source of income for hundreds of thousands of 
people, an infusion of new ideas has failed to facilitate much change in policy.  The strategies 
of the region’s newest ‘generation’ of mining sector reformers, headed by the likes of Nigeria 
and Malawi (World Bank 2009, 2012), remain very large-scale ‘biased’.  Failure to 
adequately address the needs of artisanal and small-scale operators has, as indicated, 
produced the pockets of informal mining activity now found across sub-Saharan Africa 
today.   
The NGOs and industry bodies implementing ethical mineral schemes and standards 
certainly hint that these interventions are effecting some change on the ground (see Tables 3 
and 4 for a comprehensive list of schemes and standards worldwide).  Certain organizations 
have gone as far as populating their websites with stories laden with phrases such as ‘Fair 
Trade’, ‘poverty alleviation and ‘pro-poor’, alongside graphic images, to suggest that they 
are, indeed, targeting the informal mine operators marginalized under reform.  But further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  ‘High	  fees	  knock	  off	  artisanal	  miners’,	  www.thezimmail.co.zw/2014/02/17/high-­‐fees-­‐knock-­‐off-­‐artisanal-­‐
miners/	  (Accessed	  13	  June	  2014);	  ‘Licenses	  delay	  leads	  to	  illegal	  mining,	  say	  small	  miners’.	  
http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2011/11/05/licences-­‐delay-­‐leads-­‐to-­‐illegal-­‐mining-­‐say-­‐small-­‐miners/	  	  
(Accessed	  	  12	  June	  2014).	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analysis reveals a very different story: that these interventions are not targeting the poor 
masses and were not conceived with this in mind.  In fact, the schemes and standards 
implemented to date are now embedded within existing ‘uneven’ policy and institutional 
frameworks.  The next section of the paper provides clarification on who these schemes are, 
in fact, targeting and examines critically their potential impact developmentally, in the 
process reflecting on what the ethical minerals agenda has become in sub-Saharan Africa.       
Ethical Minerals: Fairer Trade for Whom in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Efforts made to deliver more ethically-sourced minerals to market have undoubtedly 
been buoyed heavily by a global drive to mine more responsibly.  But as Hilson (2014) 
explains, with no international guidelines in place, designers and implementing bodies have 
found themselves in a position to devise their own definitions of ‘ethical’.  Consequently, 
many of the schemes and standards being piloted/implemented were founded on very 
different conceptualizations and ideas (See Tables 3 and 4).  This confusion likely extends to 
consumers, who have displayed naivety about the inner workings of the ethical mineral 
schemes implemented in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1).  Proponents of ethical consumption 
argue that consumers, who are rightly demanding more information about the products they 
purchase, ‘at a personal level’, are able to ‘lead lives that are more moral’, and that ‘at a 
public level,…can use their purchases to affect the larger world by putting pressure on firms 
in a competitive market to change the way that they do things’ (Carrier, 2010, p. 672).  
Ethical – and more broadly, alternative – trade ‘attempts to make the relations of production – 
in terms of labor and its impact on nature – a visible part of the commodity’ (Hudson and 
Hudson, 2003, p. 414).  For consumers, the decision to embrace alternative and by extension, 
ethical, trade is certainly well-placed, influenced heavily by political injustices and ‘the 
notion of unequal exchange in North-South economic relations’ (Renard, 2003, p. 89).  Is the 
ethical minerals agenda speaking to deliver justice to the marginalized masses in sub-Saharan 
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Africa?  Specifically, through these initiatives, are the millions of African ‘barefoot’ 
prospectors, marginalized under structural adjustment and who now find themselves trapped 
in the informal economy, ‘reacquiring’ any agency and gaining a more autonomous foothold 
in a reformed mining economy?  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
 
In an attempt to answer these questions, the discussion that follows reflects critically 
on the direction, objectives and projection of the main ethical mineral schemes and allied 
interventions implemented in the region to date.  It combines the content analysis of key 
media (websites, brochures and project reports) with feedback from interviews conducted, 
during June-October 2011, April-September 2012 and January-August 2014, with 12 
individuals involved in the design, implementation and/or running of selected schemes and 
standards.  The analysis serves as a reminder that – at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa 
– ethical mineral schemes and standards are not development interventions as is commonly 
believed.  Where necessary, the respondent is anonymized.  
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Ethical Minerals: Empowering Africa’s Poor? 
Few areas of international development have projected more ambiguous and at times, 
spurious, messages than ethical minerals and standards.  With the exception of perhaps the 
Development Diamond Standards, no scheme implemented in sub-Saharan Africa to date was 
designed to ‘reach’, empower and provide agency to marginalized ASM operators; nor will 
many likely ever be in a position to do so.  Making this happen would require considerable 
effort on the part of designers to adapt schemes appropriately or for marginalized groups to 
undertake the onerous task of complying with stringent standards, a necessary first step being 
to legalize activities by acquiring the requisite permits, which, as explained, is challenging for 
most.   
Some implementing bodies have been quite transparent about this.  The World Gold 
Council, for example, acknowledged at the time of its inception that its Conflict Gold 
Standard is ‘available to any party involved in the extraction of gold, including artisanal and 
small-scale mining enterprises’ but made clear that it ‘contains a demanding set of processes 
and practices that entities need to meet in order to demonstrate performance…[and that these] 
demanding criteria, as well as the requirement for external assurance, may be well beyond the 
capacity of many artisanal and small-scale mining enterprises’ (World Gold Council, 2012, p. 
3).  These points were emphasized in a recent interview with an official: 
The Standard is written for any gold miner, not just for our members…it is not…and in 
theory, it is open to any gold producer but clearly, the standards set out are demanding 
for large scale producers, large scale miners that support that responsible conflict free 
gold is good for their business, and that they can get external assurance and publish 
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their results, and gives confidence to their producers in a responsible way…We do 
recognize that these standards are likely to be taken up by large-scale miners…4 
Conceivers of the Initiative for Responsible Mining (IRMA Standard) are equally clear on 
who they are targeting, explaining that ‘it is not designed to be applicable to small-scale or 
artisanal mining, but is intended to avoid or mitigate potential negative impacts of industrial 
mining on small-scale or artisanal miners’ (IRMA, 2014, p. 8).   
Other bodies, however, have not been particularly transparent about which groups 
they are targeting.  Many imply that they are, in fact, reaching and empowering the poorest of 
operators in sub-Saharan Africa.  For example, Fairtrade Gold is pitched as a scheme which 
targets the ‘Some 15 million artisanal and small-scale miners [who] scrape a living doing 
backbreaking work in harsh conditions to produce 200-300 tonnes of gold a year’, and who 
‘are at the end of long and complex supply chains and have little option but to accept the 
price offered by traders, however low’.5  Officials at the Alliance for Responsible Mining 
argue that implementation of its Fairmined Standard leads to ‘improved environmental 
management, especially mitigating the effects of use of mercury and other toxic chemicals, 
enhancing ecological restoration, and responsible water management’ and ‘promotes the 
wellbeing of families and children in mining communities, brings better social security, 
gender equality, child protection and the elimination of child labor in certified organizations’ 
(ARM, 2014).  Officials at Columbia Gem House have gone as far as stating on the 
company’s website that ‘when conscientious consumers sip their fair trade coffee, the fingers 
that hold their cups can be adorned with Fair Trade Gems from Columbia Gem House, Inc.’6 
— the implication being that purchases of ‘Fair Trade’ rubies are mobilizing and empowering 
poor rural masses (Hilson, 2014).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Interview,	  24	  July	  2014.	  
5	  ‘Gold’,	  http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/gold/	  (Accessed	  3	  April	  2014).	  
6	  See ‘Fair Trade Gems’, www.columbiagemhouse.com/fairtradegems.html (Accessed 4 July 2014).	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The evidence tells a very different story, however: specifically, that few of the ethical 
mineral schemes and standards being piloted/implemented to date in sub-Saharan Africa are 
reaching poor operators, or are even attempting to do so.  Moreover, without assistance, it is 
unlikely that the individuals who carry out the subsistence ASM activity described by Hilson 
(2012), Luning (2014) and others could ever position themselves to access schemes such as 
Fairtrade Gold or Fairmined Gold.  Again, these miners are impoverished, lack support and, 
most significantly, are unable to secure licenses, which despite claims by one official in an 
interview that the (official’s) organization is ‘working to helping these [artisanal] miners even 
if they are never likely to certify’,7  immediately excludes them from these certification 
processes.  In the rare instance that these family-based operators are able to secure a license, 
they must reorient their practices entirely in order to position themselves to comply with 
near-impossible certification criteria.  For Fairtrade Gold, to ‘receive a guaranteed minimum 
price and an additional 10% Fairtrade Premium to invest in improving their business or in 
community projects such as education, clean water and healthcare’, it is explained, ‘strict 
standards on working conditions, health and safety, handling chemicals, women’s rights, 
child labour and responsibility to the environment’.8  The Fairmined Gold certification 
process is equally comprehensive. It requires that ‘All operators in the supply chain…be 
Fairmined certified, authorized or licensed and maintain the Fairmined labelled Gold 
completely separate from any other gold, and no mass balance or mixing of sources with non-
Fairmined is allowed’ (ARM, 2014). 
During a recent presentation, a pioneering Fair Trade jeweller conceded that reaching 
the informal, unlicensed mine operator in Africa was, indeed, exceedingly challenging, which 
is why most ethical mineral schemes and standards target ‘low hanging fruit’ (Valerio, 2014).  
When probed about why they are not doing so, despite suggesting that impoverished groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Interview,	  17	  April	  2014.	  
8	  ‘Gold’,	  http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/gold/	  (Accessed	  3	  April	  2014).	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are being targeted, an official echoed these sentiments, explaining in an interview that, ‘at the 
moment, you know, the only thing we can do is support the acquisition of mineral titles, 
whether it be agreements with other mining entities’.9  Another official, in direct 
contradiction to the reference made to Fair Trade coffee on the (official’s) company website, 
explained in an interview: ‘Don’t go the artisanal route [which is] Wild and uncontrollable’, 
furthermore expressing his scepticism ‘of running up the Bolivian Andes and the Amazon 
Jungle and finding a miner and saying “this is Fair Trade” because it doesn’t work’.10 
Although not stated explicitly, it is apparent that, in sub-Saharan Africa, marginalized 
ASM operators are being overlooked or excluded outright from participating in ethical 
mineral programs and standardization schemes. 
 
Ethical Mineral Schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa: Who Benefits? 
Who, then, are designers of ethical mineral schemes and standards targeting in sub-
Saharan Africa?  One official cast considerable light on this during an interview, asking: ‘Do 
you think Fair Trade and ethical minerals are consumer or retailer-led?’11  If informal miners, 
marginalized by regulatory frameworks and the state, were the centrepieces of initiatives, 
then such officials would likely be asking very different questions.  This is further evidence 
that ethical mineral schemes and standards are not development interventions, as is often 
projected.   
Returning to the question, both retailers and consumers have shaped the ethical 
minerals agenda, and seem willing to forge partnerships with the poorest of operators.  But 
the lack of policy ‘space’ provided for, and attention given to, informal ASM, the low public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Interview,	  13	  April	  2014.	  
10	  Interview,	  13	  October	  2011.	  
11	  Interview,	  14	  July	  2014.	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awareness of the sector’s dynamics, and the general lack of guidance given to implementing 
bodies has spawned schemes and standards which connect with licensed, more established 
operators.  Some organizations initially denied this to be the case but have since changed 
their views.  For example, the policy issued by the Alliance for Responsible Mining states 
that the ‘[Fairmined] scheme is for artisanal and small-scale miners as defined in section 
0.2.1, not industrial medium- or large-scale mining’ (ARM, 2014).12  An official from the 
organization, however, painted a very different picture during an interview, conceding that 
only a small fraction of operators could realistically access the Standard:     
…We have kind of identified that within our maybe in the global ASM gold sector, that 
we have kind of pinpointed that maybe only 10% of the mining ASM mining 
organizations in the world would actually be potential like certified communities…You 
know, just that top 10% would be able to meet the requirements of the Standard.13 
The same applies to the Fairtrade Gold Standard, which, according to its website, was 
‘developed to help miners formalise and improve their mining and business practices’.14  
Fairtrade certified gold mines, including the famous Colombia-based Oro Verde cooperative, 
are closer to being medium-scale than artisanal.  An official implied as much in an interview, 
hinting that the organization was, indeed, pursuing more ‘ready-made’ setups.  The official 
further noted that ‘We [Fairtrade] chase volume of supply before demand, 600 kg certified 
gold from Latin America for 200 kg of demand’.15  Other organizations, such as Gemfields 
and Columbia Gem House, have built their programs around more mechanized, large-scale 
activity, labelling their efforts to develop vertically-integrated supply chains ‘Fair Trade’ 
(Columbia Gem House, 2010; Gemfields, 2013). 
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  Authors’	  italics.	  
13	  Interview,	  14	  April	  2014.	  
14	  ‘Gold’,	  http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/gold/	  (Accessed	  3	  April	  2014).	  
15	  Interview,	  1	  April	  2014.	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The informal African miner has not been deliberately excluded during the design 
phase.  It is rather a case of implementing bodies not paying sufficient attention to this 
category of operator.  Specifically, in the absence of any real pressure to do so, organizations 
have cultivated partnerships with formalized small-scale, medium-scale and industrial mines 
(the so-called ‘low-hanging fruit’), arguably those operations which, in the current policy 
environment, are best positioned to fulfil stated objectives.  Thus, whilst certainly not directly 
excluding informal operators from certification, designers of ethical mineral schemes have 
shown little interest – at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa – in challenging the trade and 
policy structures which have marginalized their existence.   
A preoccupation with delivering traceable mineral product has led organizations, 
conservative and fairly inflexible in their approaches, to circumnavigate, as opposed to 
challenge, existing structures and networks.  The groundwork was laid by the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), launched specifically to eradicate conflict diamonds 
from circulation and to assure the delivery of traceable stones to the market. Spiegel (2014) 
projects the KPCS as a development intervention, presenting arguments based on interviews 
conducted with miners who claimed to have extracted diamonds in the Marange diamond-
producing area of Zimbabwe.  It is author states at the outset of his analysis that ‘advocacies 
against diamond certification as well as advocacies favouring certification both tended to 
overlook the interests of artisanal miners, focusing narrowly on certain forms of conflict 
while associating artisanal mining with illicitness’ (p. 1).  The author insinuates a link 
between KPCS certification and ‘Fair Trade’, arguing that, ‘This analysis adds to growing 
skepticism among geographers when contemplating the power of a ‘‘conflict-free’’ brand to 
account for complex injustices in the mining sector and to critiques of ‘‘fair trade’’ 
movements for ‘‘fetishizing’’ while obfuscating capitalist commodity chains more broadly’, 
and points to how ‘The Marange case suggests that critiques of ethical branding instruments 
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should take into account the diverse and dynamic political interests inherent in mining 
industry/ civil society/government initiatives that strive for the certification of commodity 
chains’ (p. 9).  The KPCS, however, despite focusing on the output from informal mines, was 
never conceived for ASM.  The Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production 
(WGAAP), described on the KPCS website as ‘the youngest working group of the Kimberley 
Process (KP)’ (Van Bockstael and Vlassenroot, 2009), was not established until 2007, or a 
full four years following the intervention’s official launch and a year after the diamond rush 
in Marange commenced, which the author himself acknowledges. 
The KPCS – again, an initiative not designed for informal ASM, despite heavily 
focusing on the commodities it produces – has set the tone for more recent interventions.  
Whilst often packaged as ‘Ethical’ or ‘Fair Trade’, most schemes are nothing of the sort.  
Shaped by discourses on security, conflict minerals and civil war, the main priority for most 
is to supply commodities that can be traced to the source.  An initial group of schemes – 
specifically, those designed for implementation in sub-Saharan Africa – are aligned with the 
requirements of two major legislative/policy interventions.   The first is the US Dodd-Frank 
Act, 2010, which deals specifically with the DR Congo and adjoining countries.  Section 
1502 of the act requires companies listed and traded on US stock exchanges to disclose 
information on the use of ‘conflict minerals’, defined as cassiterite (tin), columbite-tantalite 
(tantalum), gold and wolframite (tungsten), needed to fabricate a product.  Although the act 
applies to only companies listed on American stock exchanges, because each is required to 
provide details of suppliers, it has significant implications for European corporations as well 
(Herda and Snyder, 2013; Manhart and Schleicher, 2013).  The second is the complementary 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas, which ‘provides detailed recommendations to help companies 
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respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral purchasing 
decisions and practices’ (OECD, 2012).   
Both landmark interventions have nourished and supported more established medium-
scale miners.  Although the instability in the DR Congo and surrounding countries has been 
fuelled by power struggles, debates over land, identity and citizenship (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004), the Dodd-Frank Act has had the effect of linking violence in DR Congo 
directly to minerals, a view which has proved popular with NGOs such as Global Witness.   
This has given industry bodies, looking out for the business interests of their members, even 
more reason to target ‘low hanging fruit’.  Excluded from these schemes, the 8-10 million 
people in the Eastern DR Congo who, as Vogel (2014) explains, make their living from 
informal ASM and claim they were not consulted prior to the passing of the Dodd Frank Act, 
have struggled to earn an income, leading many to join militias and triggering the outright 
collapse of local economies.  The OECD Due Diligence Guidance reinforces the minerals-
conflict narrative but misleadingly suggesting that it focuses on local development, contesting 
that, ‘In conflict-affected and high-risk areas, companies involved in mining and trade in 
minerals have the potential to generate income, growth and prosperity, sustain livelihoods 
and foster local development’ (p. 12).  It even contains an Appendix, Suggested measures to 
create economic and development opportunities for artisanal and small-scale miners, the 
stated aim of which is ‘to minimise the risk of marginalisation of the artisanal and small-scale 
mining sector, particularly the victims of extortion, while promoting conflict-free gold supply 
chains, thereby creating economic and development opportunities for artisanal and small-
scale miners’ (p. 114).  It is clear, however, from the repeated reference to ‘companies’ in 
The OECD Guidance, and the requirement for such companies to integrate into their 
management systems a robust ‘Five-Step Framework for Risk-Based Due Diligence in the 
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Mineral Supply Chain’ (OCED, 2013), that partnerships with informal ASM operators are not 
being sought. 
Although not stated explicitly, it is clear, from the results thus far, which operators the 
designers of ethical mineral schemes and standards built around the Dodd Frank Act and/or 
the OECD Guidance are targeting.  One of the more illustrative examples of this is iTRi’s 
Sustainable Tin Supply Initiative (iTSCi), which ‘assists upstream companies (from mine to 
the smelter) to institute the actions, structures, and processes necessary to conform with the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance (DDG) at a very practical level, including small and medium 
size enterprises, co-operatives and artisanal mine sites’.16 Officials have made it clear that the 
scheme focuses solely on ‘traceability’ which, they maintain, ‘is essential for ensuring that 
minerals from certified mines can be credibly identified and traded’ (iTRi, 2010, p. 1).  
Although the organization does not intentionally exclude any operation from its program, 
given the highly-complex tagging system it has instituted, it is clearly targeting specific 
operations.  Not surprisingly, as confirmed by an official, the 460 sites in Rwanda and 500 in 
DRC (South Kivu) that were certified at the time of writing are sophisticated, medium scale 
setups (Cooper, 2014).   
A second group of schemes has emerged on the back of these efforts: those packaged 
as ‘Fair Trade’ and/or ‘ethical’.  The Fairtrade and Fairmined programs, which top the list, 
have struggled to gain much traction in sub-Saharan Africa.  The standards for each were 
modelled after sophisticated, well-established small and medium-scale mining operations 
located in unique geological environments in Latin America, such as Colombia-based Ore 
Verde.  Although interviews with officials failed to clarify why such operations are being 
targeted, it seems, from material published in documents and on websites that, much like the 
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  ‘iTSCi	  Project	  Overview’,	  www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_zoo&view=item&Itemid=189	  (Accessed	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first category of schemes, the primary objective here is to deliver traceable product.  For 
Fairtrade gold, it is stated that Fully Traceable Gold ‘will remain the core business model’.17  
The Alliance for Responsible Mining is even more concise on this issue, stating that the 
Standard ‘adheres to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Conflict and High-risk Areas, 
while seeking to enable traceable supply chains to market in support of traditional ASM’ 
(ARM, 2014).   
These organizations seem reluctant to adapt their standards and reach out to 
marginalized informal operators in sub-Saharan Africa.  They have rather made a series of 
deliberate and curious decisions, including siting a project in Kenya, a country that barely has 
a gold mining sector; launching other projects in fairly off-the-radar locations, such as 
Burkina Faso and Uganda, which offer few transferable lessons; and targeting well-to-do 
operators in the ‘mature’ mineral economies of Ghana and Tanzania.  One official explained 
why in an interview: 
The standard [is] open to any miner who is organized.  [This] used to be a cooperative 
structure but it can be any organizational setup.  In East Africa [however] the best run 
miners are entrepreneurial-run…We are looking for ones who could get certified 
quickly.18 
Thus, despite being packaged as ‘ethical’ and, through imagery and text, at times implying 
that poor, marginalized operators are being empowered, such schemes were clearly 
implemented with a view of targeting ‘low-hanging fruit’, forging partnerships with 
operations that are mechanized and which would be considered more affluent and/or 
medium-scale.     
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  ‘New	  Fairtrade	  Gold	  and	  Precious	  Metals	  Standards	  Published’,	  www.fairtrade.net/single-­‐
view+M538639b3300.html	  (Accessed	  12	  March	  2014).	  
18	  Interview,	  1	  April	  2014.	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A final category of schemes and standards, which also seek to deliver traceable 
commodities to market, have been built around large-scale operations.  Topping this list of 
producers is Gemfields, with its flagship operation in Zambia, and Columbia Gem House, 
which, following its internally-published Quality Assurance and Fair Trade Gems Protocol, 
works to source gemstones, through its manufacturing/retailing platform, Trigem Designs, 
‘Direct from the Mine’.  On the website of the former, it is explained that ‘Gemfields, in 
partnership with its dealers and manufacturers, ensures a consistent supply of coloured 
gemstones to its consumers and offers certification of full disclosure directly to these 
discerning clients’.19  An official explained in an interview that the company engages in 
‘sustainability and health and safety’ around its mine and sells stones ‘through auctions in 
Zambia’.20  The latter undertakes similar activity, its managers claiming not to  ‘support those 
who utilize business practices such as: employing child labor or slave labor, demanding 
employees to work exorbitant hours, paying below the standard or minimum wages, 
destroying the environment, smuggling, or supporting terrorists groups’.21  To clarify, 
however, neither seeks to provide agency to the poorest of – in this instance, gemstone – 
operators.  Their concern seems to be providing assurance, which their executives believe can 
best be accomplished through implementing vertically-integrated supply chains.  As Cross et 
al. (2010) explain, with gemstones, ‘The relationship between artisanal or small-scale miners 
and their buyers and dealers are almost entirely undocumented’ – specifically, that ‘There is 
practically no record of who these actors are, what their links are to the communities involved 
in production or to the companies involved in large-scale mining operations in the wider 
gemstone industry’.  Although, as the authors further point out, ‘industry associations play an 
important role in mediating relationships between [artisanal] traders’, and that ‘Recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  ‘	  Transparency,	  from	  mine	  to	  market,	  http://consumer.gemfields.co.uk/responsible-­‐gemstone-­‐
mining/transparent-­‐route-­‐to-­‐market	  (Accessed	  12	  August	  2014).	  
20	  Interview,	  14	  July	  2014.	  
21	  ‘Fair	  Trade	  Gems’,	  www.columbiagemhouse.com/fairtradegems.html	  (Accessed	  12	  April	  2014).	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research suggests that these industry associations are likely to be pivotal to the introduction of 
any ethical initiatives in the sector in relation to gathering support and ensuring that local 
understanding is embedded in the initiative’ (p. 25), the work being undertaken by the 
companies which fall into this category and packaged as ‘ethical’ are more reminiscent of 
Corporate Social Responsibility or basic community development exercises. 
 
Ethical Mineral Schemes: Surveying Impacts in sub-Saharan Africa 
To date, it has mainly been the retailers, suppliers, a select group of ‘elite’ operators 
and implementation bodies themselves that have benefited from the launch of ethical mineral 
schemes and standards in sub-Saharan Africa.  Henderson et al.’s (2002) comprehensive 
three-part GPN conceptual framework is a useful framework for debating further the 
distribution of the impacts of these interventions in the region. 
The first element of the framework is value, specifically, its creation, the 
circumstances under which it can be enhanced and the ways it can be captured.  As explained, 
the targeting of ‘low hanging fruit’ and subsequent ‘re-tracing’ of existing or easy-to-
construct supply chains for the purposes of guaranteeing traceability has had minimal 
developmental impact both directly and indirectly.  For most of the organizations purportedly 
working to deliver ethically-sourced precious minerals, a point of emphasis has been forging 
partnerships with established operators with export licenses and/or who have links to the 
jewellery market.  The design of standards based on experiences in Latin America could 
explain why parallel moves made in sub-Saharan Africa have had such little traction thus far: 
the unwillingness of implementing bodies to engage with the region’s informal operators who 
have been marginalized in an era of reform has likely led to such a random selection of mine 
partners in the region.  In the rare instance where genuine efforts are being made to partner 
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with marginalized operators, the most illustrative example being the Development Diamond 
Standards pilot project in Sierra Leone, the absence of ‘supportive’ development policy could 
prove too formidable to overcome, and consequently, force a move to link with a more 
reachable, well-established operator. 
On the decision to target more established operators – so-called ‘low-hanging fruit’ – 
interviewees consistently broached the idea that ‘one must start somewhere’.  But when 
interviewees were probed about the possibility of providing agency to informal operators, 
there was a feeling of trepidation detectable.  Officials consulted at some organizations, such 
as the Alliance for Responsible Mining and Fairtrade Foundation UK, do not seem 
particularly enamoured with the idea in the slightest.  This could explain why, at present, the 
former’s Fairmined Gold Standard is ‘neither intended for new gold rush situations, nor for 
newcomer mining in environmentally sensitive areas’ (ARM, 2014), and in the latter’s 
Fairtrade Gold Standard, ‘responsible mining’ is described quite rigidly as ‘artisanal mining 
without environmental contamination and with full ecological restoration, and entails 
avoiding rush-type mining and invasion of protected areas’ (Fairtrade International, 2013).   
Many interviewees believed the forging of robust partnerships with large and medium-
scale mining companies to be a key to empowering informal operators.  One official, for 
example, explained that ‘I would like to try also sites which are a bit more, I would say, a bit 
more wild but where the industrial permit holder would be involved in the process as well as, 
for example, as marked in their CSR policy’.22  Another explained that his organization wants 
to ‘go gradually’ through ‘work with the mid-scale mines to try to do some kind of with the 
illegal ones we negotiate with them and if we can shed off part of the concession where they 
are working, so that we, we, we support them to formalize or to regularize their operations’.23  
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  Interview,	  17	  April	  2014.	  
23	  Interview,	  13	  August	  2014.	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Such a move, however, would depend on companies being open to the idea of working with 
informal operators, in many cases, with individuals they have long feuded with over land (see 
Hilson and Yakovleva 2007; Lange 2008).  It also assumes that established mining 
companies are willing to take full responsibility for the groups they invite to work on their 
concessions.  Some are not prepared to do so, as one official made clear during an interview: 
But throughout our work [in Ghana]…clearly…some of them [the companies] are 
seeing small-scale miners as a threat to their operations and wouldn’t want to go near 
them at all.  You see?  There was one mine...Endeavour Resources…they are in the 
process of shedding off some of their concession…but we go to them to partner to 
manage the activities of these small scale miners…[but] they told us point blank, they 
don’t want to have anything to do with them…24 
Even if potential partners can be identified, informal ASM parties must also be willing to 
participate.  Curiously, no interviewee seemed to recognize the potential challenges with 
persuading artisanal mining groups to work with the very companies which have prevented 
them from securing licenses. 
The jewellery community is in a position to benefit from these efforts, regardless of 
who is being empowered. Many retailers, manufacturers and distributers have skilfully 
expanded their portfolios to include ‘ethical minerals’, therefore facilitating access to a 
perpetually-expanding consumer base.  Significantly, aspirations to conform to the 
Responsible Jewellery Council’s comprehensive Chain of Custody (CoC) Certification, 
which ‘aims to support claims for responsibly-sourced jewellery materials (known as CoC 
Material) produced, processed and traded through the jewellery supply chain’,25 effectively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Interview,	  21	  August	  2014.	  
25	  ‘Chain-­‐of-­‐Custody	  Certification’,	  www.responsiblejewellery.com/chain-­‐of-­‐custody-­‐certification/	  (Accessed	  
14	  August	  2014).	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prevents these parties from reaching out to informal mine operators.  The Certification 
Handbook (RJC, 2012) is very explicit about what mining activity is ‘eligible’, stating that 
gold and platinum group metals must be ‘produced under responsible mining practices, as 
defined by the RJC Code of Practices or a comparable standard recognised by the RJC 
[Responsible Jewellery Council], or by ASM on an Entity’s concession under an initiative 
supporting professionalisation and formalisation of ASM, or Mining Byproduct declared by a 
CoC Certified Refiner, and Conflict-Free as demonstrated by Due Diligence’ (p. 14).  The 
RJC is in the process of examining ways in which to make CoC certification more accessible 
to the full complement of ASM operators.  But in the meantime, it is limited to a small group 
of companies such as Honduras-based Eurocantera, which ‘extracts’ one third of its gold 
from independent artisanal miners operating on its concession (Blackmore et al., 2013). This 
type of partnership has proved highly-elusive thus far in sub-Saharan Africa.         
In the case of interventions linked to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the policy machinery currently in place appears to be little more than a 
complex self-regulatory apparatus comprised of several independent branches.  Hilson (2014) 
singled out Columbia Gem House for designing and implementing its own Quality Assurance 
and Fair Trade Gems Protocol as a framework for determining ‘Fair Trade Gems’.  Other 
organizations, however, have done the same.  For example, the World Gold Council, an 
industry association and market development organization for the gold industry, 
administered, at the time of writing, its own Conflict-Free Gold Standard, ‘designed to be 
implemented by World Gold Council member companies and other entities involved in the 
extraction of gold’ (World Gold Council, 2012, p. 1).  Similarly, iTSCi, which is a ‘not for 
profit membership based organisation’ that ‘represents the tin industry and is supported by 
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the world's most important tin producers and smelters’,26 is funded mainly by export levies 
(Cooper, 2014).  These schemes are elaborate and feature comprehensive tracking and 
tagging systems but have mainly benefitted an assortment of upstream businesses which, as a 
result of calibrating their management systems with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, 
have appeased their customers and likely profited handsomely in the process. 
The evidence in support of this lies in the magnitude of corporate reconfiguration that 
has taken place within the manufacturing and service sectors.  It was estimated, at the outset, 
that compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act would cost companies a combined US$3-4 billion 
up-front, and an additional US$200 million annually.  This includes in the range of 6000 
American and foreign companies that must comply with Section 1502 which again, covers 
products containing tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold.27  This expenditure, however, has 
nothing to do with improving local livelihoods.  It has rather been made to recalibrate 
retailing and manufacturing activities to align more closely with changing consumer tastes 
and new legislation.  But whilst the upstream diligence based on the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance is now widespread, downstream efforts are less developed (Manhart and 
Schleicher, 2013).      
This leads to power, the second strand of Henderson et al.’s (2002) framework – 
specifically, the idea that its sources and ways in which it is exercised in GPNs ‘is decisive 
for value enhancement and capture and thus for the prospects for development and 
prosperity’ (p. 450). With few exceptions, within the ethical mineral schemes in place across 
sub-Saharan Africa, power is, indeed, disproportionately distributed, confined to retailers, 
manufacturers, distributors and implementing bodies.  Their decisions to partner with more-
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  ITRI’,	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  (Accessed	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  July	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  ‘Wal-­‐Mart,	  Target	  Avoid	  Mining	  Rule’,	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  (Accessed	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established operators and implement elaborate systems of self-regulation have, for the most 
part, gone unquestioned.  Doing so runs the risk of fuelling elite capture among established 
small-scale operators, creating even more resource enclaves in mineralized landscapes 
already heavily under the control of foreign large-scale companies exporting large quantities 
of mineral output.  This, in turn, can further marginalize informal operators who have 
endured monumental struggles under reform.   
There are signs that this is already taking place.  In the Kivu Provinces, for example, 
new mineral tracking systems have reportedly created monopolies, making it difficult for 
artisanal miners to negotiate ore prices (Johnson, 2013; Manhart and Schleider, 2013).  As 
Seau (2012) explains, Section 1502 and complementary measures taken to deliver traceable 
conflict-free products, which have resulted in a boycott on most Congolese minerals, have 
had a devastating impact on local families. Most are forced to work in deplorable, unsafe 
conditions at artisanal mines for income because there are no alternative job opportunities 
other than agriculture and – ironically, given the intention of delivering ‘conflict-free’ 
product – joining a local militia.  Moves taken to connect with established mines which 
readily conform to criteria provided by the likes of the RJC, the World Gold Council and 
iTRi in response to growing pressure to deliver traceable product, has left an estimated 1-2 
million Congolese artisanal miners out of work, of whom, as many as 12 million additional 
civilians depend for their livelihoods.   
The assortment of gold certification programs taking root across sub-Saharan Africa 
could have the same effect, insulating in enclaves a series of well-established small and 
medium-scale miners under an umbrella of ‘Fair’ or ‘Ethical’ trade in states headed by 
governments that have criminalized informal artisanal activity (see Tschkert and Singha, 
2007; Childs, 2008; Katsaura, 2010).  These programs will have the likely effect of fortifying 
trade for these privileged, well-connected parties, whilst doing sparingly little for 
35	  
	  
marginalized artisanal groups persecuted by host governments for not having the requisite 
permits.  It is unlikely that attention will turn to the concerns of these operators anytime soon 
because officials seem more preoccupied with preserving the images of their own 
organizations, as noted earlier.  This in part explains why – however unlikely it is to happen – 
they are willing to wait for established miners to ‘reach out’ to informal operators.  
Moreover, without encouragement, few of the region’s artisanal mine operators would likely 
initiate any such partnership voluntarily.  Drawing on the case of Ghana, one interviewee 
explained why: 
…the cooperative concept is a constitutional provision in this country…people in any 
activity can come together and form a cooperative and be registered.  So, I don’t see 
why this small-scale miners in these small communities are exempted…they [the 
government] say they’re exempted because once they tag them as ‘illegal’, it keeps 
them away from government and then from experience, we have seen government 
sending military men, and policemen and a whole lot of things.  So the people are 
afraid of coming out and engaging with government to say you know, ‘we have a place 
in this system, to be registered to go beyond where we are’.  So one of the reasons is 
that because of the tag on them, it is very difficult to get them together to believe that 
they have the right to form a cooperative.28 
For informal artisanal miners operating in sub-Saharan Africa to have any chance of escaping 
state persecution and being a more integral part of such interventions, therefore, NGOs and 
the industry bodies implementing ethical mineral and standards in the region must assume a 
more catalytic role.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	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If the intention is for the suite of interventions being piloted and/or implemented in 
the region to have a greater impact developmentally, then schemes and standards – which 
again, were never intended for this purpose – must be adapted to local conditions, taking into 
account the unique experiences of informal artisanal operators (after Blackmore et al., 2013).  
The next, and final, section of this paper reflects more closely on how the schemes and 
standards in the region are being marketed, and the challenges with making informal artisanal 
operators more of a centrepiece of these efforts. 
Discussion and Conclusion: Critical Reflections on the Ethical Mineral Agenda in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
This paper began by detailing how mineralized sections of sub-Saharan Africa have 
changed under reform.  Guided by the landmark World Bank publication, A Strategy for 
African Mining (World Bank, 1992), host governments have sought to transform their mining 
economies into export-based industries.  They have achieved this by providing generous 
investment incentives to foreign multinational mining and exploration companies.  The vast 
sections of land awarded to these parties across the region, however, has stifled the 
formalization of ASM: hundreds of thousands of operators, struggling to secure the requisite 
permits, have been reduced to leading an informal sector existence.     
This leads to the third and final element of Henderson et al.’s (2002) framework: 
embeddedness, or the idea that GPNs ‘not only connect firms functionally and 
territorially…[as well as] connect aspects of the social and spatial arrangements in which 
those firms are embedded and which influence their strategies and the values, priorities and 
expectations of managers, workers and communities alike’ (p. 451).  Certainly, if these 
operators were a part of GPNs and connected to actors in the retailing and manufacturing 
sectors, their worlds would legitimately become more of a centrepiece of the ethical minerals 
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agenda taking shape in sub-Saharan Africa.  But it has been a point of emphasis to retrace 
existing supply chains as well as fortify networks by reaching out to established small-to-
medium sized mining operations.  In the process of working to deliver traceable mineral 
commodities to Western markets via the easiest means possible, the livelihoods of the 
region’s informal artisanal operators have, once again, been ignored. 
This, however, has not stopped the telling of very different stories.  The websites of 
many of the organizations examined in this research often use imagery and text to narrate 
very different stories.  For example, on the website of the Dutch-based NGO Solidaridad, 
which has both assisted organizations with certifying their mines and launched projects on its 
own, the following is written: 
Small-scale miners are especially vulnerable. They work long hours in dangerous 
conditions for less than a living wage. Too often the wealth generated is minimal and 
goes to middlemen, who exploit poor miners and add no value to the chain. Miners may 
be aware of the risks, but do not have the resources to improve.29  
Yet, although claiming it ‘sees that there is a solution to these problems and works together 
with mining communities, small-scale miners and jewellers to develop good gold: fair, safe 
gold mining’, Solidaridad had, at the time of writing, partnerships with only mid-level 
operators.   
Similarly, with passages such as ‘Globally, the roughly 100 million ASM miners are 
characterised by high levels of poverty and are often from the most disadvantaged part of 
society’ and ‘It is often the poorest of the poor with no other options who turn to ASM 
mining’30 populating its website, Fairtrade also hints that it is targeting poor, informal 
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  campaign’,	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  August	  2014).	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  ‘Q&A’,	  www.fairgold.org/q-­‐a/	  (Accessed	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operators with its Fairtrade Mining Standard.  Even iTRi, which is clearly not targeting 
informal ASM operators, implies the same: 
In Africa alone it is estimated that between 6 and 9 million people are directly 
employed in ASM, with many more million livelihoods depending on the sector…ASM 
is reported to be the most important segment of the mining sector in the DRC, not only 
because it produces the highest volume of mineral commodities, but also because of the 
people dependent on artisanal mining.  [iTRi, 2008, p. 1]  
The skilful use of language, particularly development jargon, and accompanying imagery 
seems to have captured the attention of scholars, many of whom have misinterpreted these 
messages.  Notable examples include Levin (2008), who, perhaps prematurely, declared that 
certification, particularly Fair Trade, presents ‘a massive opportunity’ for artisanal and small-
scale mining (p. 3), and Spiegel (2014) who – as noted earlier – seems to equate the KPCS 
with development.   
The question that should be asked is: how are organizations able to do this?  As 
mentioned, with no guidance, organizations, including the OECD, have been afforded 
considerable space to devise their own conceptualizations of ‘ethical’ and ‘fair’, as well as 
project, without scrutiny, images of activities which their management clearly has little 
interest in.  The source of the problem is the diversity of ‘ASM’: it comprises an assortment 
of activities of varying skill and mechanization, from the informal gold panner in West and 
East Africa, to the more mechanized operations of Latin America.  It is because of this 
heterogeneity that international organizations have struggled mightily to conceive universal 
definitions of ‘artisanal mining’ and ‘small-scale mining’, a task which experts spent much of 
the 1970s and 1980s undertaking, albeit with little success.  Reflecting on the dialogue that 
materialized, Jennings (2003) later described these efforts as ‘essentially futile attempts to 
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define and compartmentalize small-scale mining’ (p. 156), and Hollaway (1997) rather 
cynically mused that experts at the time were meeting ‘to define what it is they were talking 
about’ (p. 35).   
A featured element of many of the stories being told, and which no doubt captures the 
attention of a range of individuals, is exploitation, specifically the idea that informal 
operators are being marginalized by corrupt middlemen.  Consider the following passages 
from selected websites: 
Too often the wealth generated is minimal and goes to middlemen, who exploit poor 
miners and add no value to the chain.31 
Many of the estimated 15 million people working in the artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM) sector risk disease, serious injury and death. ASM miners also face 
exploitation by unscrupulous middle men.32 
The media33 have echoed these sentiments, drawing further attention to – and at times, 
sensationalizing – the idea that middlemen are exploiting informal operators, and that ethical 
mineral schemes and standards, by connecting producer to retailer, are capable of fixing this 
‘problem’.  But implementation bodies and designers, despite expending considerable energy 
speculating and writing about middlemen, have again, shown little interest in partnering with 
the very informal operators they claim are being exploited.  What is perhaps even more 
disconcerting is the simplicity with which the situation facing informal ASM operators has 
been diagnosed, and the condemnation of the middlemen on whom they depend.  In the 
absence of state support, middlemen are indispensable, providing sponsorship, access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  ‘Solidaridad’s	  gold	  campaign’,	  www.opwegnaargoedgoud.nl/english	  	  (Accessed	  13	  August	  2014).	  
32	  ‘Fairtrade/Fairmined	  Certified	  Gold	  Gives	  New	  Hope	  to	  Miners’,	  http://fairtrade.ca/en/news-­‐
views/news/fairtradefairmined-­‐certified-­‐gold-­‐gives-­‐new-­‐hope-­‐miners	  (Accessed	  11	  March	  2014).	  	  
33	  See	  also,	  for	  example,	  ‘Gold:	  you	  can	  now	  buy	  Fairtrade	  bullion	  and	  jewellery’,	  
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/gold/8323260/Gold-­‐you-­‐can-­‐now-­‐buy-­‐Fairtrade-­‐
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  (Accessed	  12	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  2014).	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markets and pastoral care.  The bonds forged with these so-called unsavoury individuals, 
however exploitative they may seem, are built on trust.  Childs (2014) provides an illustrative 
example of this is Tanzania, where the makota/miner relationship is deeply entrenched.  A 
similar situation persists in Ghana, as detailed by one interviewee:      
The [unlicensed] miners are well-organized…in the sense that you must work together 
before you can go and dig in the ground…yes that’s trust, and also you might you know 
ignore the fact that look there’s another stage after mining.  There are people who will 
sit down and put these things together.  It is also based on trust.  Then beyond that, it 
goes to another level, where there is someone there to buy.  In most cases, if you track 
the way these processes go, somebody first of all will pre-finance activities…And 
so…this is a very organized this thing…because they don’t sign papers…It is just based 
on trust…34 
These relationships, are, in fact, based on many years of trust and reputation, which promises 
of a premium and greater connection to retailers could not possibly eradicate. 
As a point of departure, it is worthwhile asking whether the ethical mineral schemes 
being implemented in sub-Saharan Africa could be adapted to take on more of a development 
role, despite not being conceived for this purpose.  It seems ironic that the organizations 
behind the region’s ethical mineral schemes and standards are expending so much energy 
raising the profiles and providing detailed accounts of marginalized informal artisanal miners 
– and therefore suggesting that for them, development is a priority – when they are targeting 
a completely different audience altogether. Specifically, despite often being portrayed as 
development interventions, these schemes and standards are doing little more than further 
empowering established ASM operators, ‘retracing’ the supply chains which they have long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Interview,	  13	  August	  2014.	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been a part of.   Moves to fortify supply chains capable of delivering traceable product to 
market – albeit through targeting ‘low hanging fruit’ – speak to a mining and development 
agenda that has become fixated on transparency.  They also speak to the direction in which 
host African governments seem to be moving with ASM.  As the ASM formalization debate 
rages globally, moves are quietly being made in sub-Saharan Africa to mechanize operations.  
For example, in Tanzania, there is now a Mineral Processing License, which grants holders 
the authority to process gold using cyanide, and in Ghana, there are discussions on-going 
about creating a new ‘Medium-Scale Mining’ category. Such ‘forced’ mechanization, 
however, is not a viable development strategy because of the level of sophistication required 
in making the transition.  It runs the risk of stifling informal operators’ access to mineralized 
lands even further by protecting and insulating more established miners. 
In summary, donors, the NGO community and host governments are far removed 
from the realities in ASM in sub-Saharan Africa.  Unless development policy is completely 
overhauled to the point where the region’s informal operators, their struggles and experiences 
are recognized, calls for these individuals to be featured more prominently in ethical mineral 
schemes will continue to be ignored.  
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